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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, INF
SUBJECT: (U) POST-PLENARY HIGHLIGHTS, FEBRUARY 25, 1983
REF: INF-419.

1. THIS IS INF-420. SECRET--ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. POST-PLENARY DISCUSSIONS AMONG NITZE, GLITMAN, KVITSINSKIY, AND DETINOV REPORTED REFTEL. HIGHLIGHTS OF OTHER DISCUSSIONS AFTER 25 FEBRUARY 1983 PLENARY MEETING FOLLOW. THE SUBSTANCE OF THESE DISCUSSIONS PERTAINED MAINLY TO THE BALANCE OF NUCLEAR FORCES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND USSR. BURNS AND WOODWORTH DEBATED WITH THE SOVIET DELEGATES THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SOVIET PLENARY STATEMENT AND THE PREMISES THAT UNDERLIE THE BALANCE ISSUE. FISCHER ARGUED THAT THE SOVIET STATEMENT WAS INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT AND WAS BASED ON THE SOVIET'S PECULIAR DEFINITION OF THE WORD "STRATEGIC," MEANING THOSE SYSTEMS THAT CAN STRIKE SOVIET TERRITORY. PAVLICHENKO STATED THAT THE U.S. SHOULD PAY CAREFUL ATTENTION TO THE FEBRUARY 23 GROMYKO INTERVIEW IN PRAVDA EVEN THOUGH IT CONTAINED NOTHING NEW. HE ALSO ASSERTED THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF EITHER PII OR GLCM WOULD BE A QUALITATIVE INCREASE IN THE THREAT TO THE SOVIET UNION; HE ADDED, FURTHER, THAT THE SOVIETS PROBABLY MADE A MISTAKE BY NOT INCLUDING U.S. "FBS" AS A MAJOR OBJECTIVE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. END SUMMARY.

3. WOODWORTH, BURNS, AND CHILCOAT MET WITH MEDVEDEV, POPOV, AND BEKETOV. THE DISCUSSIONS CENTERED ON THE BALANCE OF NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE. WOODWORTH STATED

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THAT THE SOVIET PLENARY STATEMENT DID NOT SET A CONSTRUCTIVE TONE FOR SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS BECAUSE THE ANALYSIS WAS SO CLEARLY ONE-SIDED IT LACKED OBJECTIVITY. MEDVEDEV RETORTED THAT THE U.S. DELEGATION SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN ABACK BECAUSE THE STATEMENT USED U.S. TERMINOLOGY AND PRINCIPLES, I.E., EQUAL RIGHTS. POPOV ADDED THAT THE SOVIET STATEMENT WAS PROVOKED BY THE U.S. STATEMENT OF 17 FEBRUARY, AND THAT THE U.S. WAS DISCUSSING THE BALANCE ISSUE PURELY FOR THE SAKE OF DISCUSSION. WOODWORTH SAID THAT THE TWO SIDES DIFFER ON THE BALANCE QUESTION, AND THE SOVIET POSITION IS BASED ON THE ASSERTION THAT A BALANCE EXISTS IN EUROPE. HE SAID IT IS NOT REASONABLE TO SAY THAT THE BALANCE SHOULD NOT BE A LEGITIMATE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION. THE SOVIET APPROACH HAS MADE IT A FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE. POPOV SAID THAT CONTINUED DISCUSSIONS WOULD NOT SOLVE THE MATTER; THERE EXISTS ALREADY "APPROXIMATE PARITY." IF THE SOVIET POSITION IS ACCEPTED, WE CAN REDUCE PARITY TO THE LOWEST LEVEL. BURNS POINTED OUT THAT THE ASSERTION OF A ROUGH BALANCE IS A NECESSARY AND MAJOR ELEMENT OF THE SOVIET POSITION. THE CONCEPT OF "ROUGH BALANCE" IS NOT AN ELEMENT TO THE U.S. POSITION, I.E., THE ELIMINATION OF AN ENTIRE CLASS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IN FACT, THE U.S. SIDE ARGUES THAT THERE IS NO BALANCE. BURNS FURTHER POINTED OUT THE INCONSISTENCIES IN POPOV'S ARGUMENT THAT "APPROXIMATE PARITY" EXISTS WITH TODAY'S SOVIET PLENARY STATEMENT.

- POPOV AND BEKETOV THEN ARGUED THAT A BALANCE EXISTED PRIOR TO THE 1979 NATO DECISION. THEY ASSERTED THAT NATO CONTRIVED AN IMBALANCE IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY ITS DEPLOYMENT OF MODERN LRINF MISSILES. THEY ADDED THAT, PRIOR TO 1979, THE BALANCE WAS NOT GENERALLY DISPUTED BY MOST NATO COUNTRIES. BURNS AND WOODWORTH BOTH ATTACKED THESE ASSERTIONS STATING THAT THE SOVIET DEPLOYMENT OF SS-20'S WAS A QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE CHANGE IN THE SOVIET FORCES THAT REQUIRED A NATO RESPONSE; THE NATO RESPONSE WAS NOT DESIGNED TO RESTORE A BALANCE BUT TO RESTORE A CREDIBLE DETERRENCE.

- MEDVEDEV HELD FORTH WITH A LENGTHY MONOLOGUE THAT ATTEMPTED TO EXPLAIN HOW THE DIFFERENT CRITERIA, EQUAL SECURITY AND EQUAL RIGHTS, USED BY EACH SIDE RESULTED IN A FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT AND OPPOSITE PERSPECTIVE ABOUT THE BALANCE OF NUCLEAR FORCES. THE SESSION ENDED WITH THE SOVIETS STATING THAT THEY HAD OFFERED SO MANY CONCESSIONS, THEY COULD OFFER NO MORE.

4. FISCHER AND WATERS MET WITH MASTERKOV, KUKLEV.

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ZHURALEV, AND ALEKSANDROV. FISCHER OPENED THE CONVERSATION BY REMARKING THAT THE SOVIETS PROBABLY DID NOT INTEND THAT THEIR PLENARY STATEMENT BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY. MASTERKOV SAID IT SHOULD BE INDEED TAKEN SERIOUSLY BECAUSE IT CONTAINED CONCRETE PROPOSALS FOR HOW TO REACH AN AGREEMENT, NOT JUST CRITICISMS OF ONE SIDE'S VIEW OF THE BALANCE AS THE U.S. STATEMENT OF LAST MEETING DID. FISCHER COUNTERED BY SAYING THE U.S. MADE ITS STATEMENT ON THE BALANCE BECAUSE SOVIET OFFICIALS, INCLUDING GROMYKO, KEEP ASSERTING THAT THE SOVIET VIEW OF THE BALANCE IS THE BASIS OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL.

- FISCHER SAID THAT THE SOVIET STATEMENT OF TODAY WAS INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT AND WAS BASED ON THE SOVIETS' PECULIAR DEFINITION OF THE WORD "STRATEGIC" TO MEAN SYSTEMS THAT CAN STRIKE SOVIET TERRITORY. HE SAID IT WAS STRANGE THAT THE SOVIETS SHOULD EMPHASIZE THIS DEFINITION SINCE IT WAS NOT THE BASIS OF THE SOVIET

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APPROACH AS MANIFESTED BY THEIR DRAFT TREATY. MASTERKOV REPLIED THAT ALL WEAPONS THAT CAN STRIKE SOVIET TERRITORY ARE THE SAME, WHETHER CALLED STRATEGIC, MEDIUM-RANGE, OR TACTICAL. FISCHER SAID THAT SOME U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES ARE CLOSER TO THE SOVIET UNION THAN SOVIET FORCES ARE TO THE U.S. BECAUSE OUR ALLIES THAT RELY ON THE U.S. FOR DETERRENCE ARE CLOSE TO THE SOVIET UNION.

- KUKLEV SAID IT WAS HARD TO BELIEVE THAT PURPOSE OF FBS WAS ONLY TO PROTECT ALLIES SINCE U.S. WAS ACQUIRING WEAPONS THAT COULD STRIKE DEEPLY INTO SOVIET TERRITORY. FISCHER REPLIED THAT U.S. WAS ACQUIRING THESE WEAPONS TO STRENGTHEN THE NATO DETERRENT IN THE FACE OF SOVIET SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS. MASTERKOV SAID THAT THESE WEAPONS UPSET THE STRATEGIC BALANCE BECAUSE THEY COULD BE USED IN A CRISIS TO SUPPLEMENT U.S. CENTRAL SYSTEMS. HE SAID THAT IT IS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THE SOVIET UNION NOT TO BE CONCERNED WITH THESE SYSTEMS. FISCHER SAID THAT ALL HE WANTS IS FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE CONCERN THAT THE U.S. HAS FOR ITS ALLIES IS LEGITIMATE. HE SAID THAT THE U.S. TWO-TRACK DECISION WAS INTENDED TO STRENGTHEN STABILITY EITHER THROUGH ARMS CONTROL OR DEPLOYMENTS. BUT THAT THE ARMS CONTROL SOLUTION IS THE BETTER SOLUTION.

5. VOGEL, CAMPBELL, AND STAFFORD MET WITH PAVLICHENKO. VOGEL ASKED IF THERE WAS ANYTHING IN GROMYKO'S PRAVDA INTERVIEW OF FEBRUARY 23 TO WHICH THE U.S. SIDE SHOULD PAY PARTICULAR ATTENTION. PAVLICHENKO INDICATED THAT THE U.S. SIDE SHOULD PAY CAREFUL ATTENTION TO GROMYKO'S STATEMENTS, BUT THAT THERE WAS NOTHING NEW IN THEM. IN RESPONSE TO A VOGEL QUERY, PAVLICHENKO INDICATED THAT NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT NOT CONTINUE IF THE U.S. PROCEEDS WITH DEPLOYMENTS. CAMPBELL NOTED THAT PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS SUCH AS SALT AND MBFR HAD CONTINUED EVEN AS THE SIDES WERE DEPLOYING NEW WEAPON SYSTEMS AND CHANGING FORCE STRUCTURES. STAFFORD CITED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DESCRIPTION IN HIS AMERICAN LEGION SPEECH OF THE CRITERIA AGAINST WHICH ANY PROPOSAL WOULD BE JUDGED AND HIS STATEMENT THAT THE U.S. POSITION WAS NOT A "TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT" STANCE, AND ASKED IF PAVLICHENKO SAW SOME COMMON GROUND BETWEEN THOSE CRITERIA AND THE SOVIET POSITION. PAVLICHENKO REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO COMMON GROUND, THAT THE U.S. WANTED EITHER UNILATERAL SOVIET DISARMAMENT OR DEPLOYMENT OF NEW U.S. MISSILES IN EUROPE, AND NEITHER WAS ACCEPTABLE. WITH REGARD TO THE LATTER, ANY DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE OF PERSHING II OR CRUISE MISSILES WOULD REPRESENT A QUALITATIVE INCREASE IN THE THREAT TO THE SOVIET UNION AND WOULD RESULT IN THE U.S. BEING PLACED IN THE "ANALOGOUS POSITION". STAFFORD NOTED THAT F-111'S HAD BEEN DEPLOYED IN ENGLAND FOR YEARS AND ASKED HOW CRUISE MISSILES WOULD QUALITATIVELY CHANGE THE THREAT PRESENTED BY THOSE AIRCRAFT. PAVLICHENKO INDICATED THAT IT WOULD BE A QUANTITATIVE CHANGE TO A THREAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD NEVER BEFORE MATCHED QUALITATIVELY. THE SOVIET UNION MAY HAVE LACKED THE MEANS TO MATCH THIS THREAT IN THE PAST, OR IT MAY SIMPLY HAVE CHOSEN NOT TO, BUT IT CERTAINLY WOULD DO SO IF ANY U.S. MISSILES WERE DEPLOYED. IN THAT EVENT ALL ASPECTS OF THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP WOULD CHANGE, AND THE U.S. COULD NO LONGER COUNT ON HAVING NO SOVIET FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE. PAVLICHENKO ADDED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD PROBABLY MADE A MISTAKE COMING INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THAT ITS OBJECTIVE SHOULD HAVE BEEN COMPLETE REMOVAL OF U.S. FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS FROM EUROPE. CAMPBELL SAID THE ARBITRARY SOVIET 1000 KM RANGE CRITERION EXCLUDED THOUSANDS OF SOVIET NUCLEAR-CAPABLE SYSTEMS WHICH COULD STRIKE NATO EUROPE. SHE ASSERTED THE SOVIET UNION WAS SIMPLY ATTEMPTING TO DRIVE THE U.S. OUT OF WESTERN EUROPE AND, BY

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